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ABSTRACT
The constitutionality of conditional offers from the government is
a transsubstantive issue with broad and growing practical implications, but it has always been a particular problem for free speech.
Recent developments suggest at least three new approaches to the
problem, but no easy solutions to it. The first approach would permit
conditions that define the limits of the government spending program, while forbidding conditions that leverage funding so as to
regulate speech outside the contours of the program. This is an
appealing distinction, but runs into some of the same challenges as
public forum analysis. The second approach would treat conditional
offers to purchase speech like other proposed economic transactions,
invalidating them when they are coercive. This principle helps
explain many recent cases, including the healthcare decision. And yet
the Court’s willingness to find coercion in cases involving conditional
offers from the government is hard to square with its approach to
campaign finance law and its apparent faith in markets more
generally. The third and final approach would treat limits on
conditional offers not as individual rights, but as structural
limitations on the scope of government. This approach, too, points in
the direction of possible solutions—and also further problems—for
analyzing the constitutionality of subsidized speech.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most intractable problems in constitutional law is
defining what kinds of conditional offers the government can make
to individuals, organizations, and states.1 This is a transsubstantive
issue,2 arising in cases involving affirmative government powers
under the Spending Clause,3 individual rights guaranteed by the
Free Exercise Clause,4 and state actions like granting corporate
charters,5 but it has always been a particular challenge for free
speech.6 As the realm of government-subsidized activity expands,
resolution of the conditional offer problem (also known by other
aliases, including the “doctrine” of unconstitutional conditions7)
increasingly appears to be one of the most important issues in
1. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing statesupported speech as an “intractable problem”); see also Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported
Speech, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1197 (explaining that “[a]s with many First Amendment
issues, the conflict between these two positions”—that funding decisions are either exempt
from constitutional scrutiny or subject to the same tests as other restrictions—“appears to be
irresolvable, making it impossible for the Court to develop a coherent body of doctrine”);
Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 543, 544 (1995) (“Determining the constitutionality of government subsidization of
expression is one of the most frustrating tasks facing scholars of the First Amendment.”).
2. Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10-11 (1988)
(describing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as “roam[ing] about constitutional law
like Banquo’s ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in others”).
3. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987).
4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (holding that a state could not deny
unemployment benefits to a person who refused, for religious reasons, to work on Saturday).
5. Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Though a
State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to the inconvenience, of
prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its jurisdiction, it has
no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing so.”).
6. Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L.
REV. 479, 491-92 (2012) (“Although [unconstitutional conditions] have long been treated as
merely a peripheral danger, they have become of central importance, for they have become
a means of evading much of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.... The most sobering
examples of the evasion are speech conditions.”); Heyman, supra note 1, at 1121 (“[S]tatesupported speech poses a distinctive problem—a problem that is generated by the modern
affirmative state, and must be understood in its own terms.”).
7. Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in
the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1316 (2013) (suggesting
that the “conditional offer problem” or “conditional offer puzzle” is a better label than “unconstitutional conditions doctrine”).
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constitutional law, as well as one of the most difficult.8 And despite
diligent efforts, a satisfactory answer to the problem has proven
elusive.9 Some wise and battle-weary voices describe it as simply
“too hard.”10
This short Article offers no solution. Rather, it uses one seemingly
narrow11 and somewhat underappreciated12 First Amendment case
to suggest three new(ish) ways to think about the conditional offer
problem. In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for
Open Society International, Inc. (AOSI), the Supreme Court struck
down a federal law that required private organizations receiving
government money for the fight against HIV and AIDS to explicitly
adopt a position against prostitution.13 On one level, this is a surprising result. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in the majority opinion: “As a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the
receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the funds. This
8. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J.
345, 346 n.1, 350 (2008) (predicting that to the degree “the Roberts Court has a conservative
agenda,” it will pursue that agenda “through doctrines that skew the interpretation and limit
the enforceability of conditional spending statutes”); Berman, supra note 7, at 1284 (arguing
that, of the holdings in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the holding
regarding conditional spending “is apt to have the most far-reaching consequences beyond
health care”).
This Article does not address in detail the related problems that arise when the government
leverages its relationships with private actors—those “that control the infrastructure of free
expression”—in order to regulate the expression of third parties. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,
Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2297 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 373-74.
10. Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (calling the problem
“irredeemably intractable”).
11. The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Leading Cases, 127 HARV. L. REV. 218, 227 (2013)
[hereinafter Leading Cases] (concluding that the Court in Agency for International
Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. “hewed closely to the facts” and
took a “minimalist approach”).
12. This is not to say unnoticed. See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Speech, Subsidies,
and Traditions: AID v. AOSI and the First Amendment, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 363, 364
(“applaud[ing]” the Court’s holding, but noting that “its inside/outside program distinction,
though appropriate in the presented context, can’t govern every funding condition”);
Alexander P. Wentworth-Ping, Note, Funding Conditions and Free Speech for HIV/AIDS
NGOs: He Who Pays the Piper Cannot Always Call the Tune, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1097 (2012)
(analyzing the Second Circuit opinion and advocating an approach similar to that taken by
the dissent); Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 218; Recent Case, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1506,
1509-11 (2012) (analyzing and criticizing the Second Circuit’s opinion).
13. 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
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remains true when the objection is that a condition may affect the
recipient’s exercise of its First Amendment rights.”14 And yet the
Court concluded that this general principle was inapplicable, that
the condition impermissibly compelled the organizations to speak,
and therefore the condition was unconstitutional.15
The opinions in AOSI suggest at least three approaches to the
conditional offer problem. The first focuses on the distinction at the
unstable core of the opinion: the line between “conditions that define
the limits of the government spending program—those that specify
the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek
to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the
program itself.”16 The former are permissible; the latter are suspect.17 This is an appealing distinction, for it seems to permit the
government to “take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that
its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee,”18 without “result[ing] in an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment
rights.”19 Some have lauded AOSI on somewhat similar grounds.20
But defining the scope of the program is not a straightforward
matter of statutory interpretation, in part because there is no
vantage point from which to evaluate whether a particular speech
condition is “inside” or “outside” of a government program.21 Indeed,
it is not clear how the line can be drawn, nor even why it should
matter. Perhaps this is why the majority explicitly ducked the line-

14. Id. at 2328.
15. Id. at 2332.
16. Id. at 2328.
17. Id. at 2328-29 (comparing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461
U.S. 540 (1983), which upheld a requirement that nonprofit organizations not engage in
lobbying as a condition for tax-exempt status, with FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364 (1984), which invalidated a statute conditioning all federal funding for noncommercial
broadcast television on a prohibition of all editorializing, even if the funding for editorializing
came from private sources).
18. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). Without
more, the “legitimate steps” language is circular.
19. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328. So stated, this is either a tautology or another trip around
the circle.
20. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 363 (“May the federal government, as a condition for a
private entity to receive funds to implement a government program, require the recipient to
pledge ideological support for government policies? As the Court held, of course not.”).
21. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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drawing task in AOSI,22 just as it has in other conceptually similar
cases.23 Like the “relatedness” test in Spending Clause cases,24 the
program-definition principle essentially requires courts to establish
the boundaries of appropriate constitutional governance. In that respect, it bears a striking resemblance to public forum doctrine,25 and
requires courts and scholars to distinguish between what Robert
Post calls domains of “management” and “governance.”26
A second possibility is that AOSI is best understood as a case
about the permissibility of a market transaction: the government’s
conditional offer to purchase speech.27 After all, the case does not
involve a traditional speech regulation, but an economic relationship.28 As such, the decision may hold important clues not simply
about particular doctrinal categories, but also about the Court’s
level of faith in markets and bargained-for exchanges. Considering
the Roberts Court’s apparent libertarian bona fides,29 one might expect the Justices to let the sophisticated and well-informed parties
negotiate amongst themselves. But in AOSI and a few other related
22. Id. at 2328, 2330 (majority opinion) (noting that “[t]he line is hardly clear,” but that
wherever it might be drawn, “we are confident that that the Policy Requirement falls on the
unconstitutional side of” it); id. at 2330 (concluding that the line is “not always self-evident”).
23. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2602 (2013)
(“We need not decide at precisely what point a land-use permitting charge denominated by
the government as a ‘tax’ becomes ‘so arbitrary ... that it was not the exertion of taxation but
a confiscation of property.’” (quoting Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1910)));
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.,
joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.) (“[W]herever [the coercion] line may be, this statute is surely
beyond it.”).
24. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (holding, inter alia, that conditions
must be sufficiently related to the purpose of the federal grant).
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory
of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1717 (1987).
27. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America, DEMOCRACY, Winter 2012,
at 46, 47, available at http://perma.cc/Y7B9-QJ3U (“What's missing from the criticism is a
picture of what these cases add up to: an identity for the Roberts Court as the judicial voice
of the idea that nearly everything works best on market logic, that economic models of
behavior capture most of what matters, and political, civic, and moral distinctions mostly
amount to obscurantism and special pleading.”); Ilya Shapiro, The Supreme Court’s
Libertarian Moment?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2013, 5:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/ilya-shapiro/the-supreme-courts-libert_b_3536534.html [http://perma.cc/H394-MS6F]
(“Not in every case, not always with one voice, and not without fits and starts, but as a whole
the justices are moving in a libertarian direction.”).
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cases—most notably, National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) v. Sebelius—the Court has used the Constitution itself to
regulate such exchanges.30
Why has the Court constitutionally prohibited offers and exchanges in these cases, while constitutionally protecting other forms
of exchange against government regulation? The answer apparently lies in the Justices’ views on coercion, choice, and the realities of
economic relationships. These are issues that cut across traditional
doctrinal categories, forcing reconsideration of many existing
constitutional rules. To take just one example: if the government’s
offer to AOSI was “coercive,” then the same can surely be said of the
(implicitly conditional) offers that major donors make to political
candidates. And that, in turn, suggests a much broader scope for the
corruption principle given short shrift in the Court’s recent campaign finance decisions.31
One particularly interesting wrinkle in this regard is the Court’s
suggestion that coerced speech is worse than coerced silence. This
might sound backwards, since the First Amendment is often
thought primarily to target “negative” obstacles such as prior
restraints.32 But AOSI was decided on compelled speech grounds,
distinguishing it from cases like Rust v. Sullivan in which a funding
condition simply required the would-be private speaker to remain
silent.33 This suggests that the Court might be particularly interested in the unique constitutional harms imposed by compulsion, as
opposed to constraint.34 Much of the opposition to the Affordable
Care Act’s “affirmative” mandate seemed to reflect this view.35
30. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
31. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (holding that campaign finance
regulation may only target quid pro quo corruption, meaning “a direct exchange of an official
act for money”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (“The appearance of
influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”).
32. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (concluding that prevention of prior
restraints was a primary purpose of the First Amendment).
33. 500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991) (quoting and upholding 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2012), which
provides that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in
programs where abortion is a method of family planning”) (alteration in original).
34. See Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 775-80 (2012).
35. As a doctrinal matter, the challenge to the individual mandate manifested itself in the
Commerce Clause. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) (“The individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely
because they elected to refrain from commercial activity. Such a law cannot be sustained
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The third and final puzzle this Article explores is what AOSI says
about the scope and power of government. On the one hand, the
decision strikes down part of a federal law, and in that respect appears to be government limiting.36 And yet, in the course of reaching
its compelled speech holding, the Court implicitly endorses the
proposition that recipients have some constitutionally salient entitlement to government funds.37 This, after all, is the fulcrum that the
government used for its inappropriate “leverage.”38 The Court,
therefore, essentially entrenches the size of public spending programs, while taking away one effective method of controlling them.
I. AOSI ’S DECEPTIVELY COMPLICATED HOLDING
On first reading, AOSI appears to be a relatively straightforward
decision. It does not purport to create any new First Amendment
rules. It invokes well-known precedents like Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,39 Rust v. Sullivan,40 and
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,41 and does not overrule or even
seem to limit any of their holdings. And yet a closer look reveals
that the decision is not only complicated on its own terms, but is
also usefully representative of deep, pressing, and difficult problems
throughout constitutional law.
Congress passed the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act) as the centerpiece of its strategy to fight the global spread of HIV and AIDS.42
Recognizing that a comprehensive strategy could make good use of
nongovernmental allies, Congress authorized the appropriation of
billions of dollars for that purpose.43 Such funding, however, had two
under a clause authorizing Congress to ‘regulate Commerce.’”). But, for many people, the real
root of opposition seemed to resonate in intuitions about individual rights and autonomy. See,
e.g., George F. Will, Unlawful Health Reform?, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2009, at A27.
36. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013).
37. Id. at 2328.
38. Id.
39. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
40. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
41. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
42. Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.).
43. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2324.
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related conditions: no funds “may be used to promote or advocate
the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking,”44 and
funds cannot be given to an organization “that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”45 The latter
condition, known as the Policy Requirement, was the target of the
constitutional challenge in AOSI.46
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. and the other
recipient organizations feared that compliance with the Policy
Requirement would jeopardize their relationships with host governments and also make it more difficult to work with prostitutes—an
important audience and potential ally, many believe, in the fight
against HIV and AIDS.47 The organizations argued that the Requirement was an unconstitutional condition and that it violated
their First Amendment rights by compelling them to speak.48 After
years of battling in the lower courts, and the formation of a circuit
split,49 the case wound its way to the Supreme Court.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts recognized that
“[a]s a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on the
receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the funds.”50
Nonetheless, “[i]n some cases, a funding condition can result in an
44. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e) (2012)).
45. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f)). A later regulatory guideline clarified that funding
recipients could work with organizations “engage[d] in activities inconsistent with the recipient’s opposition to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking” so long as the recipients
themselves maintained “objective integrity and independence from any affiliated organization.” Id. at 2326 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2012)).
46. Id. at 2326.
47. See, e.g., Claire Provost, Anti-Prostitution Pledge in US Aids Funding “Damaging”
HIV Response, GUARDIAN (July 24, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2012/jul/24/prostitution-us-aids-funding-sex [http://perma.cc/495T-UYJE].
48. Brief for Respondents at 20-26, AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (No. 12-10), 2013 WL 1247770.
49. The D.C. Circuit upheld the Policy Requirement, DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for
Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007), while a divided panel of the Second Circuit struck
it down. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 234 (2d
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom, Agency for Int’l
Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
50. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328. The Chief Justice made the same point in NFIB, and
similarly concluded that it, too, did not involve a general matter or a typical case: “In the
typical case we look to the States to defend their prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple
expedient of not yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the
federal policies as their own.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).
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unconstitutional burden on First Amendment rights.”51 The Policy
Requirement created just such an unconstitutional burden, the
Court found, because it “compels as a condition of federal funding
the affirmation of a belief that by its nature cannot be confined
within the scope of the Government program.”52 On the majority’s
reading, the government’s ability to impose funding conditions is
coincident with the scope of the program itself: “The relevant
distinction that has emerged from our cases is between conditions
that define the limits of the government spending program—those
that specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the
contours of the program itself.”53 The majority conceded that “[t]he
line is hardly clear,”54 but concluded that wherever it might be
drawn, “we are confident that the Policy Requirement falls on the
unconstitutional side of the line.”55
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, vigorously dissented,
arguing that the scope-of-the-program principle was out of place: “I
am at a loss to explain what this central pillar of the Court’s opinion
... has to do with the First Amendment.”56 He argued that the case
could not possibly involve compelled speech because no one was
being compelled to do anything—the organizations could simply
decline the funds if they did not want to comply with the Policy
Requirement.57 Meanwhile, the government had a perfectly valid
interest in attaching conditions to its own funds in order to ensure
that they were used only for purposes that the government itself
supports.58 All of this was consistent with Justice Scalia’s longstanding skepticism of unconstitutional conditions claims in subsidized
speech cases.59 But in other ways, the result and the Justices’
positions raise complex and novel questions.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
Id. at 2332.
Id. at 2328.
Id.
Id. at 2330.
Id. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2335 (“[T]he Government is not forcing anyone to say anything.”).
Id. at 2333.
See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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II. WHAT IS A “PROGRAM” AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?
The Court’s decision turned on a posited distinction between
speech conditions defining a government spending program and conditions regulating speech “outside” of it.60 This program definition
principle is the “central pillar of the Court’s opinion,”61 but the
Justices explicitly declined to construct it,62 and barely even gestured at its outlines. One is left wondering whether the pillar really
bears any weight. At least two basic questions must be answered.
Why does the boundary of the program matter? And how can it be
drawn?
A. Why Do Programs Matter? The Public Forum Analogy
The primary issue that divided the Justices in AOSI was whether
the boundaries of the Leadership Act program are constitutionally
salient for First Amendment purposes.63 The majority said yes
because conditions falling outside the program impermissibly seek
to “leverage” funding to regulate speech.64 Justice Scalia was “at a
loss” to see why this should be so.65 Both positions are problematic.
The idea that the constitutionality of a condition depends on
whether it applies to activities outside of the relevant program is
not unfamiliar to the First Amendment, nor to constitutional law in
general.66 In Rust v. Sullivan, for example, the Supreme Court
upheld the challenged funding restrictions because they did not
“prohibit[ ] the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct
60. See AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 2328 (describing the line as “hardly clear”).
63. For background on the concept of constitutional saliance, see Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (defining constitutional salience as “the often mysterious
political, social, cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, and economic forces that influence which policy questions surface as constitutional issues and which do not” and discussing
its application in the First Amendment context).
64. See AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
65. Id. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Cf. Schauer, supra note 10, at 994 & n.22 (noting that for some unconstitutional
conditions cases, “the slippery but useful idea of relevance was a satisfactory resolution”).
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outside the scope of the federally funded program.”67 And in Regan
v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, a nonprofit organization argued that federal law unconstitutionally conditioned the
organization’s ability to receive tax-deductible contributions on its
agreement not to engage in lobbying activities.68 The Court rejected
the claim in part because there was no evidence that the IRS imposed “stringent requirements that are unrelated to the congressional
purpose of ensuring that no tax-deductible contributions are used to
pay for substantial lobbying.”69
A similar principle appears in Spending Clause doctrine, which
shares deep structural similarities with subsidized speech jurisprudence. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that “conditions on
federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”70 And in
NFIB, the Chief Justice concluded that when conditional offers
“take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring
the States to accept policy changes.”71
The obvious question is why the distinction matters. In cases such
as Dole and NFIB involving challenges to the authority of the
federal government, some answers are apparent. Congress may only
act pursuant to its enumerated powers, and thus the Court must
conduct something like a Necessary and Proper Clause analysis to
determine whether a given action is sufficiently related to one of
those powers.72 Moreover, federalism doctrine protects the states
67. 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991). Martin Redish and Daryl Kessler describe a similar
approach when they argue that “[t]he choice of one speaker over another is constitutional if
the government bases its decision on criteria ‘substantially related’ to the predescribed
viewpoint-neutral purpose of the subsidy.” Redish & Kessler, supra note 1, at 547.
68. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). Likewise, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court
upheld a funding restriction, though Justice O’Connor noted in doing so that it would be a
“different case” if “the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of
subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints.” 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998).
69. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 n.6.
70. 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,
461 (1978) (plurality opinion)); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837
(1987) (forbidding the government from demanding surrender of an easement in return for
building permit because the condition was “unrelated” to the state’s legitimate interest).
71. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.)).
72. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
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from federal coercion, which may be implicated (though not necessarily proven)73 by threats to terminate an unrelated funding
program. Neither of those background principles can quite explain
AOSI, however. The Court decided it as a First Amendment case,
which is precisely why Justice Scalia was baffled.74
Another possibility is that the inside-outside principle is simply
a specific instantiation of the general principle—familiar from the
tiers of scrutiny—that government should not regulate more speech
than is necessary to achieve its interest.75 There is much to like
about this explanation, but it does not resolve the central question
dividing the majority and dissent, which is whether any speech has
been regulated at all. From Justice Scalia’s perspective, questions
of overbreadth and means-end scrutiny are irrelevant.
Perhaps the Justices simply went down the wrong doctrinal path.
Though unconstitutional conditions and compelled speech might
both be relevant to AOSI, the program-definition principle actually
bears a striking resemblance—somewhat for better and largely for
worse—to standard public forum analysis. This is both a weakness
and a strength, for it offers a normative justification for the program-definition principle, while raising a whole new set of similarly
intractable problems.
Though things are quite a bit more complicated in practice, the
simplified hornbook version of public forum analysis is that public
forums are “those places which ‘by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.’ ”76 They can include
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional.”).
73. Sam Bagenstos argues persuasively that a threat to terminate an independent
program “is the trigger for conducting a coercion analysis, not the conclusion of that analysis.”
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101
GEO. L.J. 861, 869 (2013).
74. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. (AOSI), 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2333
(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. I am very grateful to Greg Magarian for pushing me on this point.
76. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (“[T]raditional
public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government’s intent.”); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); see also United States v. Kokinda, 497
U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (“We have held that ‘[t]he government does not create a public forum by
... permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for
public discourse.’”).
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both physical spaces, like parks, and government activities, like the
distribution of mail. Within them, most restrictions on speech are
subject to strict scrutiny,77 whereas in a limited public forum, the
government has broad power to regulate “in light of the purpose
served by the forum,” even if that means drawing lines on the basis
of subject matter and speaker identity.78 Beyond this lies government speech—a relative latecomer on the First Amendment scene,
which is not integrated into the public forum analysis framework
but operates as a kind of government-empowering absolutist alternative.79 The stripped-down version of the government speech doctrine suggests that when the government speaks, it can say what it
wants,80 even if that means discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint.81
This description suggests a deep symmetry with the programdefinition principle. The basic goal in either case is to find a
boundary between public discourse and speech subject to government control for instrumental purposes.82 If a speech requirement
reaches speech “outside” of a program, it is treated like a regulation
in a public forum and is accordingly subject—as the Policy Requirement was—to the usual rules of First Amendment analysis.83 This
77. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70, 276 (1981) (holding that, in public forums,
the only acceptable restrictions are those on time, place, and manner, or content-based
restrictions that are narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest).
78. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (“Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on
subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.” (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49));
see also Post, supra note 26, at 1762 (“The Court has never precisely defined what it means
by this ‘reasonableness’ standard, but at a minimum it is clear that it is designed to provide
the government the utmost flexibility in managing the nonpublic forum.”).
79. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (upholding the
government’s power to deny display of a monument in a public park, on the basis that doing
so was government speech rather than regulation of a public forum).
80. The Establishment Clause is generally thought to be the only limit on government
speech, though Nelson Tebbe has persuasively suggested others. Nelson Tebbe, Government
Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 650 (2013).
81. See generally Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 695 (2011).
82. Post, supra note 26, at 1798 (“Public forum doctrine rests on the distinction between
a public realm, in which social values and ends are constituted, and organizational domains,
in which these values are taken as premises and implemented.”).
83. Judge Straub pursued this line of reasoning in his dissent from the Second Circuit
panel opinion, albeit reaching the conclusion that no public forum existed. Alliance for Open
Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 263 (2d Cir. 2011) (Straub, J.,
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was the majority’s approach. By contrast, if a condition merely
defines the boundaries of the program or reaches only speech inside
it, then the case will be analyzed as if it involves a limited public
forum or government speech, giving the government broad discretion to impose conditions. This was Justice Scalia’s approach.
The symmetry between these doctrines is aesthetically pleasing,
but not analytically reassuring, for it suggests that the programdefinition principle might well face the same struggles and dead
ends as public forum analysis. Some of these false starts seem
especially likely to infect thinking about conditions on speech
“inside” government programs. Consider, for example, Davis v.
Massachusetts, an ancestor of public forum doctrine, in which the
Court compared the government to “the owner of a private house”
and concluded that it could therefore freely limit speech occurring
on its property.84 The ghost of Davis haunts the subsidized speech
cases, appearing for example in Rust’s conclusion that the government can “selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities
it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program” because “[i]n so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”85 As in
Davis, the conceptualization here is easy enough to understand: the
government can do what it wants with its own property.
And yet despite its appealing clarity, the ownership approach is
unsatisfactory. It simply assumes its essential premise, which is
that the government can impose whatever conditions it wants so
long as its own resources are being used. And indeed in the postDavis line of public forum cases, the Court has rejected the simple
version of this property-ownership approach, layering it with a
flavor of public trust doctrine86 and clarifying that the government’s
dissenting) (“Congress did not authorize Leadership Act funds ‘in order to create a public
forum for [private organizations] to express themselves.’” (quoting United States v. Am.
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003))), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
84. 167 U.S. 43, 46-47 (1897).
85. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
86. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”).
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ownership of a resource does not include unlimited power to regulate speech occurring within it.87
The question, then, is whether a normative justification can be
found for the program-definition principle that does not simply rely
on the government’s ownership of the relevant funds. One possibility lies in the distinction between what Robert Post calls “governance” and “managerial” domains.88 The difference between the
government’s power in these domains is stark and fundamental:
In situations of governance the state is bound by the ordinary
principles of first amendment jurisprudence, but when exercising managerial authority ordinary first amendment rights are
subordinated to the instrumental logic characteristic of organizations, and the state can in large measure control speech on the
basis of an organization’s need to achieve its institutional ends.89

Post connects this framework to the division of resources “within”
and “outside” of government organizations,90 just as the Court does
in AOSI.91 But rather than focusing on “the character of the
government property at issue,”92 as the Court did in the discredited
Davis line,93 Post advocates a focus on “the nature of the government authority in question.”94
This provides not only a conceptual approach to the problem—a
redefinition of terms—but also a normative foundation for doctrine.
The government should, indeed must, have authority to control
speech in contexts where government property (whether physical,
financial, or otherwise) is properly dedicated to instrumental
purposes.95 But outside those domains, speech conditions may have
87. See generally Joseph Blocher, Government Property and Government Speech, 52 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1413 (2011).
88. See generally Post, supra note 26.
89. Id. at 1775.
90. Id. at 1785.
91. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328, 2330 (2013).
92. Post, supra note 26, at 1717.
93. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46-47 (1897).
94. Post, supra note 26, at 1717.
95. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2001) (“Democratic governments must speak, for
democracy is a two-way affair.... Speech is but one means that government must have at its
disposal to conduct its affairs and to accomplish its ends.”).
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the effect of regulating public discourse, and thus are appropriately
subject to the usual First Amendment rules, including—as in
AOSI—the prohibition on compelled speech.
B. How Can Programs Be Defined?
The previous Section argued that the best way to understand and
justify AOSI ’s program-definition principle is as a search for the
difference between governance and management—the same basic
inquiry that animates public forum doctrine. But this is a very
slippery concept on which to rest a constitutional rule,96 and it is
somewhat troubling that the Court explicitly avoids identifying the
line. Perfect clarity and precision are undoubtedly impossible, but
in order to be a desirable or even functional legal standard, the
difference between these domains must be both conceptually comprehensible and practically identifiable.
One initial question is how it is even possible for a governmentimposed condition to be “outside” a government-created program. In
AOSI, the Court concluded that “[b]y requiring recipients to profess
a specific belief, the Policy Requirement goes beyond defining the
limits of the federally funded program to defining the recipient.”97
But this again assumes an essential premise—that professing such
a belief is not part of the program. Sometimes an explicit statement
of belief is an essential part of the program; indeed, that is precisely
what the government argued in AOSI.98 And as the Justices recognized in Rosenberger, “we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker

96. Bagenstos, supra note 73, at 905 (“[T]he very idea of a separate, independent program,
which serves as the analytic fulcrum of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion [in NFIB], is itself
extremely problematic.... [H]is opinion provides no reason why pre-ACA Medicaid should not
be understood as having tied together separate programs.”); Rhodes, supra note 12, at 363
(noting as a “valid concern” the “malleability of, and the constitutional source for, the Court’s
articulated distinction between conditions ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the program”); Schauer, supra
note 10, at 995 (“This approach … allows the state to evade, more easily than would be
preferred, the premises underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine simply by redefining the nature of the activity.”).
97. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330.
98. Id. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Elimination of prostitution is an objective of the
HIV/AIDS program, and any promotion of prostitution—whether made inside or outside the
program—does harm the program.”).
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or when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”99 Can
a court simply decide that a speech condition is not part of a larger
program?
On one level, the answer to the question is a clear—or at least
well-entrenched—yes. After all, nearly any act of statutory interpretation involves determining, for example, the boundaries of government action. Why should determining whether the Leadership Act
includes the Policy Requirement be any harder than determining
whether the honest services fraud statute includes undisclosed selfdealing?100 But to say that courts can or must draw those lines does
not reveal anything about how they should go about doing so. Statutory interpretation, after all, applies different canons in different
contexts—the honest-services fraud statute was read in light of the
rule of lenity,101 which in turn is justified in terms of fair notice, the
restriction of law enforcement discretion, and other values.102 What
are the tools and normative justifications that courts should use
when defining the boundaries of a government speech program?
One possibility would be to give deference to the government’s
own definition, just as the Court seems to do in cases involving the
Spending Clause.103 After all, the political branches might know
better than any court whether a particular condition is inside a
government program. Judicial efforts to define the program might
interfere significantly with its administration. As the Court put it
in a related context, “government officials should enjoy wide latitude
in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”104 And indeed the Court
has occasionally deferred to governmental institutions like schools,

99. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
100. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931-33 (2010) (finding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 covers only bribery and kickback schemes).
101. Id. at 2932-34.
102. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 34546.
103. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (requiring only a minimal
relationship between an expenditure and the government interest involved); United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (deferring to congressional judgment as to whether the
spending power is being exercised in pursuit of “the general welfare”).
104. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (rejecting First Amendment claims of a
government employee fired after distributing a questionnaire to fellow employees).
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prisons, or the military when evaluating the constitutionality of
speech restrictions.105
Despite the conceptual appeal of this approach, it suffers major
consequential defects. Primary among these is that it would give the
government enormous power to define its own power, particularly
given that the scope of the program is likely to be defined broadly,
and retroactively, for the purposes of litigation. As the Court recognized in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, “Congress cannot recast
a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every
case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic
exercise.”106
If not by deference to the political branches, how should courts go
about identifying the boundaries of a spending program? Post is
straightforward about the difficulty in public forum cases: “There is
no magic talisman to distinguish public from nonpublic forums. As
a society, however, we recognize managerial domains by the presence of an instrumental orientation embodied in the exclusion of
roles and statuses inconsistent with the attainment of organizational ends.”107 Focusing on those roles and statuses may at least
help orient the analysis, even if it does not provide clear answers. If,
as was arguably true in AOSI, the fund recipients are oriented to a
common goal, much like members of a private organization, then
they lie within the program. By contrast, “if a resource is used by
individuals occupying widely different roles and statuses, with
correspondingly divergent values and expectations, the resource lies
in the public realm, and the state’s authority over it is a matter of
governance. The resource is a public forum,”108 and the usual First
Amendment rules apply.
Similarly, evaluating a program against a background of tradition
and entrenched practice may help identify the program’s boundaries,109 in much the same fashion as the Court has identified
105. See Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note
About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635
(2007); see also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821
(2008) (arguing for deference to certain speech institutions’ internal rules).
106. 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001).
107. Post, supra note 26, at 1834.
108. Id. at 1793.
109. See Rhodes, supra note 12, at 364 (lauding AOSI ’s result in part because “no tradition
allows the government … to manipulate a program’s scope to assert control over a traditional
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traditional public forums.110 In Velazquez, to take just one example,
the Court struck down a condition that prohibited federally funded
lawyers representing indigent clients from challenging existing
welfare laws.111 In doing so, the Court concluded that this condition
distorted the “usual functioning” of the legal system and interfered
with attorneys’ “traditional” representation of their clients.112
Of course, none of these approaches offer a clear-cut way to
answer the question of whether a particular speech restriction falls
within a subsidized speech program. Indeed, there is no vantage
point from which to get a clear view of what is inside or outside the
program. In drawing that line, the Court is shaping the very boundaries of public discourse.
III. WHEN DID THE COURT LOSE FAITH IN MARKETS?
Another way to understand AOSI is as a case about market
transactions and permissible consent to economic offers. This framing makes it easier to evaluate another broad trend in the Court’s
current jurisprudence. It is often said that the Roberts Court has
advanced a basically libertarian agenda in which bargained-for
exchange is freed from legal restrictions.113 Some of the Court’s most
prominent decisions have used the First Amendment as a deregulatory tool,114 striking down regulations of various kinds—on
campaign contributions115 and the sale of prescription drug information,116 for example.

sphere of expression”); id. at 386 (advocating a tradition-based approach that “would preclude
the government from attempting to use viewpoint-based funding conditions in subsidized
venues that have long been open to a variety of viewpoints”).
110. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”).
111. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536-37.
112. Id. at 543-44.
113. See supra note 29.
114. Purdy, supra note 29, at 49 (noting that the First Amendment has recently “become
a linchpin in the Supreme Court’s anti-regulatory cases”).
115. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
116. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).
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But in another set of cases—all of them involving situations in
which the government itself is a party to the bargain—the Court has
forbidden or unwound exchanges. The most prominent example of
this is NFIB, in which a seven-Justice majority found that the federal government’s conditional offer of Medicaid funding was
unconstitutionally coercive.117 The result has been to impose,
through the Constitution, the kind of limits on exchange that the
Court has elsewhere used the Constitution to strike down. What
accounts for this apparent oddity?
A. Entitlements and the Persistent Problem of “Coercion”
In both AOSI and NFIB, the most straightforward solution to the
fund recipients’ complaint seems to be for them to decline the funds
and thereby avoid the objectionable condition. Addressing the
matter in NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “The States are
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act
like it.”118 Writing for a majority in AOSI, the Chief Justice acknowledged that “[a]s a general matter, if a party objects to a condition on
the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to decline the funds.”119
Why does neither case fall within the reach of that seemingly
expansive “sometimes” or “general matter”?
The ingredient that apparently makes the difference is coercion.
As Kathleen Sullivan observed more than twenty-five years ago,
“Directly and through metaphors of duress or penalty, the Court has
repeatedly suggested that the problem with unconstitutional conditions is their coercive effect.”120 Despite the frequency of its invocation, though, the concept of coercion remains somewhat ephemeral.
As Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion alleged, the majority in AOSI
117. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.); id. at 2666-67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
118. See id. at 2603 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.)
119. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013); see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (“States have no
entitlement to receive any Medicaid funds; they enjoy only the opportunity to accept funds on
Congress’ terms.”).
120. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428
(1989); see Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 154 (1996) (“When the state
supports speech, it establishes a relationship between itself and private speakers that can
sometimes compromise the independence of the latter.”); see also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) (considering whether a conditional subsidy went beyond “the point
at which pressure turns into compulsion”).
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“pussyfoots around the lack of coercion,” which he attributed to the
fact that “[t]he majority cannot credibly say that this speech condition is coercive, so it does not.”121 The latter is consistent with his
long-held view that as far as the First Amendment is concerned, the
government “may allocate ... funding ad libitum.”122
And yet Justice Scalia agreed with the Court in NFIB, which
Justice Ginsburg noted was the “first time ever” the Court found
that a spending condition unconstitutionally coerced the states.123
As the dissenting Justices put it:
As we have explained, the legitimacy of attaching conditions to
federal grants to the States depends on the voluntariness of the
States’ choice to accept or decline the offered package. Therefore,
if States really have no choice other than to accept the package,
the offer is coercive, and the conditions cannot be sustained
under the spending power.124

The Court was not unanimous on this point, however, nor is it even
clear what the Justices meant by it.125 Justice Ginsburg, who would
later see coercion in AOSI, saw only an irresistibly good deal in
NFIB: “all that matters, it appears, is whether States can resist the
temptation of a given federal grant.”126
This Article cannot possibly offer a satisfactory definition of
coercion—that task has bedeviled scholars for decades. AOSI does,
however, suggest new ways to think about it. Specifically, the Court
seems to equate coercion with its conclusion that the condition
reached speech outside the program. There are at least two possible
ways to justify that connection.

121. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2334-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 599 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
123. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 2661 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
125. Berman, supra note 7, at 1285-86.
126. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2640 n.24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (criticizing the dissent’s position); see also South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (holding that a conditional spending program is not
coercive “simply by reason of its success in achieving the congressional objective”).
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One possibility, the implications of which are explored in somewhat more detail below,127 is that fund recipients, whether they be
states or private organizations, have some entitlement to funds
“within” the program, and that it was the threat to take these away
that made the offer coercive. This explains why the Court pointed
to a USAID document suggesting that organizations that failed to
adhere to the Policy Requirement could lose existing awards.128 Indeed, the Court has long recognized that spending programs create
obligations “in the nature of a contractual relationship.”129 On this
reading, the Court’s efforts to prevent coercion are really just efforts
to prevent the government from retroactively adding conditions to
its existing obligations, just as the NFIB Court invoked the rule
against “surprising participating States with post-acceptance or ‘retroactive’ conditions.”130
As a descriptive matter, the source of these obligations is less
clear. The government has no duty to fund such programs, and
characterizing them as entitlements—which AOSI and NFIB
implicitly do131—requires an account of baselines set by statute,
history, prediction, or some other method.132 Whatever the source of
these entitlements, it is unclear why their denial should give rise to
First Amendment claims.133 If the government has entered into a
contract—whether with a state, an individual, or an organization
like AOSI—and then violates the terms of that deal, the legal harm
is to the party’s bargained-for expectations, not necessarily (though

127. See infra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
128. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. (AOSI), 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330
(2013).
129. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659-60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see
also id. at 2602 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.) (employing contract analogy);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[L]egislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”).
130. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.) (quoting
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25).
131. See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
132. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1351-74 (1984); id. at 1353 (defining coercion as “an alteration
of the position one would have enjoyed in the normal course of events”).
133. Epstein, supra note 2, at 14 (“There are no shortcuts to this form of analysis. In order
to understand unconstitutional conditions, it is first necessary to understand the function and
limitations of consent, and the bargaining processes by which it comes about.”).
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not exclusive of) their individual constitutional rights.134 Such
constitutional claims would seem to have a more natural home in
the Due Process Clause than in the First Amendment.
The second reason why the program’s boundaries might matter
in a subsidized speech case is because when the government places
conditions on speech acts outside of a program, it has effectively
gone from calling the tune—which is perfectly appropriate—to calling the piper, which is not. The piper has freely consented to play
a particular tune, and therefore cannot complain when its speech is
“compelled” to that extent. But when the government reaches
beyond the boundaries of that agreement, it manages grantees
rather than grants.135 This it cannot do. When the government
subsidizes messages, it properly purchases speech, but not speakers.
For this to make sense, though, there must be some reason why
the fund recipient is or appears to be coerced into doing things
beyond the program’s boundaries. One possible explanation is that
the size of the program, whether or not it is something to which the
recipient is entitled, creates coercion. In their joint dissent in NFIB,
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito emphasized the
amount of money that the states stood to lose (or, at least, not to
gain) if they declined the federal government’s offer.136 The Chief
Justice seemed to have in mind something similar when he wrote
that “[t]he threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall
budget ... is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real
option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”137
A similar rationale could help explain the result in AOSI. Like
the states in NFIB, the organizations subject to the Policy Require134. Cf. id. at 11 (“[I]f common law duress were present in these cases, the recipient of the
grant would be able to attack the offending condition without resorting to any special doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions.”).
135. The Court made the same point inversely in Rust v. Sullivan. 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991)
(“The Secretary’s regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related
speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct from
Title X activities.” (emphasis added)).
136. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662-63 (2012); see also Bagenstos, supra note 73, at 867
(“[T]he joint dissent focuses its analysis primarily on the large amount of money at stake,
though some of its language also adverts to the entrenched nature of the existing grant
program.”); Rhodes, supra note 12, at 378 (“The Leadership Act thus cherry-picked the
application of a preferred political ideological pledge as the basis to award billions of dollars
of funding, funding essential to many of the recipient organizations.”).
137. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
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ment simply could not afford to say no to the government’s offer.
Indeed, by some measures they had even less choice. Though states
stood to lose 10 percent of their overall budgets if they declined the
Medicaid expansion, many organizations involved in the AOSI
litigation depended on the government for up to two-thirds of their
funding.138
Whether this makes the offer coercive or overwhelmingly generous is a question beyond the scope of this Article. The focus here is
on the implications for freedom, choice, and markets, and those
implications are surprisingly broad. Consider, for example, the
campaign finance context, in which competition plays a role
analogous to coercion. Though the conditions are usually implicit,139
campaign contributions are, in form, quite similar to the conditional
offer in AOSI. If the mere size of a spending program is enough to
raise concerns that a recipient is beholden to the government, then
will voters have the same concerns when a major corporate donor is
the contributor and a politician is the recipient? If so, the Court has
perhaps been too restrictive in the degree to which it permits the
government to regulate campaign speech for the purpose of avoiding
the appearance of corruption.140 The practical and doctrinal stakes
are different in AOSI and Citizens United v. FEC, but the question
of the piper’s freedom to play its own tune is basically the same.
B. Is Coerced Speech Worse than Coerced Silence?
There is one more wrinkle in the Court’s First Amendment
analysis that is worth particular attention: the apparent suggestion
that coerced speech is somehow worse than coerced silence. This is
138. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 378 (noting that the billions of dollars paid out under the
Act were “essential to many of the recipient organizations”). AOSI itself is not fully dependent
on the government. See Wentworth-Ping, supra note 12, at 1131 n.261 (noting that AOSI
received a grant of nearly $2.2 million from the Open Society Institute, which is financed by
George Soros).
139. An explicit conditional offer might shade into outright quid pro quo corruption, though
the lines are hardly clear. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV.
118, 121 (2010) (“Once the Supreme Court announced in Buckley that the concern over
corruption or even its appearance could justify limitations on money in politics, the race was
on to fill the porous concept of corruption with every conceivable meaning advocates could
muster.”).
140. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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something of a novel proposition, both because the question is rarely
asked and because the answer is surprising.
Most unconstitutional conditions cases involve requirements that
a party refrain from speaking. In fact, the Policy Requirement
challenged in AOSI was apparently the first time Congress had ever
imposed an ideological pledge as a condition for funding.141 The Second Circuit majority found this to be significant, and emphasized as
much in its opinion striking down the Policy Requirement.142 The
distinction drew dissents143 and criticism144 but reappeared in the
Supreme Court’s own analysis.
The majority repeatedly described the Policy Requirement as one
that “compels” speech,145 and Justice Scalia’s dissent agreed that
“[t]he constitutional prohibition at issue here is ... the First Amendment’s prohibition against the coercing of speech.”146 The constitutional foundation for this prohibition is long-standing, if somewhat
slippery. The Court has repeatedly held that the Amendment
“guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the
decision of both what to say and what not to say.”147 As a normative
matter, the prohibition on compelled speech can be justified on

141. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 390; Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 218 (“In its
unconstitutional conditions cases, the Supreme Court has often examined the
constitutionality of speech restrictions imposed as a condition of government funding. The
Court has had less occasion to consider affirmative speech requirements.”).
142. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 234 (2d
Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom, Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2321 (2013).
143. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 678 F.3d 127, 129-30
(2d Cir. 2012) (Cabranes, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
144. See Recent Case, supra note 12, at 1509-10 (criticizing Second Circuit opinion for
relying on this distinction).
145. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. (AOSI ), 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332
(2013).
146. Id. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) (emphasis added); see
also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of thought protected
by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all.” (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 633-34 (1943))).
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many different grounds, for example, protecting the autonomy of the
coerced speaker,148 or preserving the integrity of public discourse.149
No matter which normative underpinnings of the doctrine are
most compelling (so to speak), AOSI raises the separate question of
whether and why compelled speech is different—and, apparently,
worse—than coerced silence. The right to speak and the right not to
speak are generally treated as “complementary components,”150
neither one more important than the other. If anything, restraints
on speech are probably thought to be a more central First Amendment concern than efforts to require it—hence the special suspicion
reserved for prior restraints.151
But in AOSI, the Court seemed to suggest that the affirmative
nature of the speech rule was outcome determinative. The best
evidence of this lies in the Court’s focus on whether AOSI had adequate alternative outlets for its speech.152 The attention given to this
issue demands explanation, for it is not immediately clear why it
should be relevant to a compelled speech analysis. For example, the
schoolchildren in Barnette prevailed on their First Amendment
claim notwithstanding whatever other opportunities they had to not
salute the flag.153
As in other unconstitutional conditions cases, the government argued in AOSI that the recipient organizations were free to express
their own viewpoints—even to distance themselves from the viewpoint set out in the Policy Requirement—by working with or through
affiliate organizations.154 But the Court found that setting up
148. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)
(concluding that compelled speech “violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message”).
149. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89
B.U. L. REV. 939, 979 (2009) (“Compelled speech also distorts the marketplace of ideas and
democratic decision-making by misrepresenting the views of speakers forced to propound a
viewpoint that is not their own.”).
150. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
151. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (identifying prior restraints as
“the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights”).
152. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330-31 (2013).
153. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compelling children in public schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance violates the First
Amendment).
154. Brief for Petitioner at 44-49, AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (No. 12-10), 2013 WL 701226. This
argument only really became tenable after a later guideline clarified that fund recipients
could work with organizations “engage[d] in activities inconsistent with the recipient’s
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affiliate organizations not bound by the Policy Requirement was no
remedy, precisely because fund recipients were obligated to adopt
the government’s message “as their own.”155 As a result, they had no
effective way to distance themselves from the government’s message: “If the affiliate is distinct from the recipient, the arrangement
does not afford a means for the recipient to express its beliefs. If the
affiliate is more clearly identified with the recipient, the recipient
can express those beliefs only at the price of evident hypocrisy.”156
It follows that one of the determinative flaws in the Leadership Act
was that AOSI could not pursue independent goals “on its own time
and dime”157—it had to comply with the Policy Requirement at all
times, and even when using funds not received from the government.158
The lack of adequate alternatives could just as easily have been
conceptualized as a restraint on speech.159 Indeed, as a matter of
framing, the same thing can be said of nearly any compelled speech
case. In Wooley v. Maynard, for example, the district court found
that the First Amendment was infringed because the parties were
prohibited from covering up the words “Live Free or Die” on their
license plates,160 whereas the Supreme Court found a First Amendment violation in the fact that the “statute in effect requires that
appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the
opposition to the practices of prostitution and sex trafficking” so long as the recipients
themselves maintained “objective integrity and independence from any affiliated
organization.” AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2326-27 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2012)); see also Regan
v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 n.6 (1983) (upholding restriction
in part because organization could still act through affiliated organizations).
155. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. at 2330.
156. Id. at 2331.
157. Id. at 2330.
158. The district court focused on this argument. See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v.
U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that the Policy
Requirement did not permit “alternate channels” outside the scope of the program), aff’d, 651
F.3d 218 (2d. Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
159. I have argued elsewhere that one way to reconcile the apparently contradictory
principles that the government can say what it wants, but that it must not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint, is by permitting adequate alternatives for private speakers. Blocher,
supra note 81, at 755-59.
160. See 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1976) (“Since we accept plaintiffs’ contention that
their acts constituted constitutionally protected symbolic speech and that the state cannot
prosecute them for masking the motto, we need not consider whether their First Amendment
right to be free from a required affirmation of belief is implicated.”), aff'd, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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State’s ideological message—or suffer a penalty.”161 These are two
sides of the same coin.
Recognizing this symmetry also suggests one way in which
compelled speech—at least where adequate alternatives are not
available—might indeed be as bad as the bête noire of speech
regulation: the prior restraint.162 In both scenarios, when a party is
forced to speak or when it has no opportunity to disclaim an imputed message, the harm to both the speaker and the marketplace of
ideas is irremediable. Perhaps that is why in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, the foundational case in compelled
speech jurisprudence, the Court concluded that “[i]t would seem
that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more
immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”163 One might equally
see AOSI as involving compelled speech because disclaimers were
unavailable, or as involving restrained speech because disclaimers
were forbidden.
The Court floated another possibility, which is that the government’s offer would have been permissible if made to organizations
that already agreed with the Policy Requirement. The majority suggested as much when it said that the requirement was not designed
“to enlist the assistance of those with whom [the government]
already agrees,” but rather to oblige “a grant recipient to adopt a
particular belief as a condition of funding.”164 On this view, the government can purchase “existing” speech with which it agrees, but
may not pay for its creation. Government funds can therefore be
used to reward, but not to incentivize, private speech.
This principle is attractive in some ways, as it would effectively
eliminate the possibility of coercion. It would in fact remove recipient choice from the equation entirely, because the government’s
“offer” would not be made in exchange for any kind of performance.
But it is insufficient as a general principle for resolving subsidized
speech cases. Permitting only rewards, not offers, would be hard to
square with Rust v. Sullivan’s (obviously correct) holding that “[t]he
161. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
162. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (identifying prior restraints as
“the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights”).
163. 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).
164. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. (AOSI ), 133 S. Ct. 2326, 2330
(2013).
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Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest.”165 Moreover, it would essentially mean treating the
world of private discourse as conceptually separate from, and prior
to, the government’s involvement. And this is simply not the way
the world works. Private organizations, let alone states, shape and
organize themselves in response to government funding priorities
as well as their own goals.166 Government spending programs do not
simply order from a preexisting menu; they shape and create it.
None of this is meant to minimize the potentially important difference between government efforts to incentivize or compel activity
and government efforts to restrain or forbid it. Rights to and not to
engage in particular constitutionally salient activities involve distinct philosophical and doctrinal complications.167 These are likely
to become increasingly important as government spending programs
and intuitions about freedoms “not to” grow stronger. Just as the
individual mandate was thought by many to be problematic on the
basis that it compelled individual activity, the Leadership Act’s
Policy Requirement was apparently the first time Congress had ever
imposed such an ideological pledge as a condition for funding.168
IV. LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT’S POWER, WHILE PRESERVING
ITS REACH
Finally, one might understand AOSI as a case about government
power full stop. On this view, what is troubling is not the harm to
AOSI, but rather the aggregate effect of so many conditional offers.
Each offer alone may be noncoercive and yet still add up to a problem if the government buys up too much of the public domain.
A power-limiting principle, rather than one operating from the
viewpoint of fund recipients, is consistent with approaches to
unconstitutional conditions that are keyed to structural concerns
165. 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (emphasis added).
166. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What
Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989) (emphasizing the degree
to which law shapes social background).
167. See Blocher, supra note 34, at 792-93; Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear
Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012).
168. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 390.
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about the power of government. Though not the current orthodoxy,
this is the kind of coercion principle that Philip Hamburger advocates when he argues that an offeree’s “consent is irrelevant for
conditions that go beyond the government’s power.”169 The reason
for this is, in part, that “constitutional rights are also structurally
the people’s legal limits on the government’s powers.”170 Richard
Epstein has described a similar approach that would focus unconstitutional conditions analysis not on conventional recipient-specific
grounds like duress and undue influence, but rather on problems of
government monopoly and collective action.171
The practical motivation for the power-limiting approach is not
hard to see. Twenty years ago, Seth Kreimer’s pathbreaking article
on allocational sanctions argued that governmental control over
benefits was a more powerful form of coercion than traditional “negative” controls,172 and the decades since have reinforced the point.
Consider federal grants to state and local governments. One recent
study found that federal grants constituted less than 1 percent of
state and local revenues in 1902; by 1952, 10 percent; and by 2006,
30 percent.173 Unsurprisingly, then, “fiscal and political realities
make it difficult for states and local governments to turn down any
offers of federal aid.”174
The same is true, perhaps even more so, for individuals and
private organizations. Rocky Rhodes notes that “government agencies have an estimated 200,000 grant agreements and other
contracts with approximately 33,000 human-service nonprofit
organizations, with government funding providing almost two-thirds
of all revenue for these organizations.”175 Rhodes concludes that
“[t]he threat to liberty if the government can leverage all of these
169. Hamburger, supra note 6, at 480.
170. Id. at 484.
171. Epstein, supra note 2, at 8, 14-15.
172. Kreimer, supra note 132, at 1295-96.
173. Douglas A. Wick, Note, Rethinking Conditional Federal Grants and the Independent
Constitutional Bar Test, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1363-64 (2010) (citing JONATHAN GRUBER,
PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 258-59 (2d ed. 2007)); id. at 1364 (“In just ten years, total
federal grant expenditures went from $285 billion in fiscal year 2000, to $653 billion in fiscal
year 2010.” (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL
TABLES FISCAL YEAR 2011, tbl.12.1. (2010))).
174. Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1140 (1997).
175. Rhodes, supra note 12, at 376.
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subsidies and grants to require entities to pledge allegiance to government policies wouldn’t be speculative, but a real abridgement on
free expressive rights.”176 The threat, in other words, is not to any
one fund recipient, but to public discourse as a whole.
What is fascinating about this reading is that unconstitutional
conditions cases point in two directions at once: they limit the government’s power, but constitutionally entrench its size. The latter of
these may be surprising. But when upholding an unconstitutional
conditions-style claim in a case like AOSI, the Court suggests that
the recipient of what might seem to be government largesse actually
has some kind of constitutional entitlement to those funds. Were it
otherwise, the case could be decided on the basis of the Chief
Justice’s observation that “[a]s a general matter, if a party objects
to a condition on the receipt of federal funding, its recourse is to
decline the funds.”177 There would, after all, be no unfair “leverage”178 if the rest of the policy did not exist—one cannot use a lever
without a fulcrum. The Court thus gives a kind of oblique endorsement to the “New Property”179 approach and turns away from the
“bitter with the sweet” approach advocated by the previous Chief
Justice.180
Even while it affirms, and in some sense constitutionally freezes,
the government’s reach, the Court’s decision also limits the government’s authority to control those domains. The government can
create a sprawling range of endowments and spending if it wishes.
But conditional offer cases like AOSI limit the government’s ability
to control that spending. Indeed, the antileveraging principle the
Court describes is a subtle but potentially powerful tool for controlling government power. If the parties’ reliance or past relationship
with the government effectively limits the government’s ability to
make new offers, then the Court is effectively using the government’s size against it, a kind of constitutional jiu jitsu.
176. Id.
177. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. (AOSI ), 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328
(2013).
178. Id.
179. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778-79 (1964) (arguing that
government largesse should be treated as a form of personal property).
180. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) (holding that
Puerto Rico’s greater power to ban gambling altogether included the lesser power to ban gambling advertising); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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The practical implications of this depend not only on doctrine, but
also on political realities. The Court gives the government increased
incentive to rein itself in by limiting the government’s power over its
programs.181 In this way, the true practical impact of a seemingly
limited holding—excising the Policy Requirement from the Leadership Act, for example—may be to topple the entire program. The
choice the government faces (which, ironically, seems somewhat
coercive) is whether to continue the program without the ability to
control it as designed. As a practical and political matter, this is the
equivalent of removing a gear from the machine. It is stealthy
judicial review.
Putting these untenable political choices back into the government’s hands suggests another way of characterizing the government-limiting approach to constitutional conditions, which is as an
effort to control the government’s political power. As scholars have
long recognized, one danger of government-subsidized speech is that
it can dominate public discourse, perhaps even drowning out competing voices.182 Moreover, some danger exists that by acting
through other speakers, the government can distort or even avoid
the political process while hiding its influence. By forbidding or
changing the terms of conditional offers, the Court can theoretically
correct these supposed political failures.
Many areas of constitutional doctrine—including some that seem
to be of particular interest to the Roberts Court—are designed to
avoid this kind of ventriloquism. One animating rationale behind
the Court’s anticommandeering jurisprudence, for example, is that
it ensures proper political accountability by saving state officials
from taking the blame for federal mandates.183 This rationale
emerged in NFIB, especially in the Chief Justice’s conclusion:
181. Epstein, supra note 2, at 28 (“When the government is told that it cannot bargain with
individuals, the empirical question arises whether government will deny them a useful benefit
altogether, or grant them the benefit without the obnoxious condition.”).
182. See, e.g., David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 682 (1992) (“[G]overnmentfunded speech both creates possibilities for a more democratic and inclusive public debate and
threatens to dominate the market and overwhelm individual autonomy with its vast
resources.”); Rhodes, supra note 12, at 382 (“[G]overnment’s unique access to and control over
speech avenues—and its trillions of dollars of financial resources—risk unduly influencing
public discourse and distorting the marketplace of ideas.”).
183. Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1631-34 (2006) (describing, but not endorsing, this rationale).
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“[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate,
it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.” Spending Clause programs do not pose
this danger when a State has a legitimate choice whether to
accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds.... But
when the State has no choice, the Federal Government can
achieve its objectives without accountability.184

Though the empirical supposition is debatable,185 the principle is
clear enough: voters must be able to identify who is playing the
tune. In other areas of First Amendment law, the Court has recognized these as legitimate state interests sufficient to justify some
kinds of speech regulation. For example, even while striking down
corporate contribution limits in Citizens United, the Court upheld
the provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act requiring
disclosure of campaign contributions.186
Interestingly enough, one place the Court has been reluctant to
require transparency is in its government speech doctrine, discussion of which was surprisingly absent from the opinions in AOSI.187
Because that doctrine essentially holds that the government can say
what it wants,188 it is a potentially expansive tool of government
power. And much to the consternation of many First Amendment
184. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-03 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,
joined by Breyer and Kagan, JJ.) (citation omitted) (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 169 (1992)); see also Bagenstos, supra note 73, at 904 (“[B]oth Chief Justice Roberts
and the joint dissenters urged that the point of prohibiting federal coercion was to promote
the accountability of state officials to their residents.”).
185. Berman, supra note 7, at 1306 (“This passage is hard to read with a straight face. The
Court was, after all, deliberating over the fate of a law universally known as ‘Obamacare.’”).
186. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“The First Amendment protects political
speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate
entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions
and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”); see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct.
2811, 2815 (2010) (upholding a Washington law requiring disclosure of referendum petitions).
187. AOSI, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2013); Leading Cases, supra note 11, at 224 n.61 (“This
point was sufficiently obvious that the Court devoted a mere three words to it. At first glance,
it is curious that the dissent did not press the idea that the policy requirement was
government speech—many of Justice Scalia’s policy arguments evoke the government speech
cases.” (citation omitted)).
188. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (“[T]he Government’s own
speech ... is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”).
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scholars,189 and to the disappointment of lawyers in government
speech cases,190 the Court has thus far declined to require that the
government explicitly adopt a message as its own in order to qualify
as government speech.
A government-limiting principle imposes constraints on the
government’s ability to make conditional offers that, even if accepted by the offeree,191 would expand the government’s power too far.
Of course, establishing what counts as “too far” raises its own
conceptual and practical difficulties. The goal here is simply to
describe the principle, rather than to show how far it extends.
CONCLUSION
In his thoughtful investigation of the First Amendment rules
applicable to subsidized speech, Robert Post concluded that “[t]he
doctrines have become formalistic labels for conclusions, rather than
useful tools for understanding.”192 AOSI confirms that Post’s observation remains accurate nearly twenty years later. Though the
outcome of the case turns on various First Amendment rules, the
doctrinal levers are pulled by the Court’s conclusions regarding the
definition of the program at issue, the permissibility of certain
economic transactions, and the reach of the government’s power.
And understanding these underlying inquiries demands a more

189. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 95, at 1384 (2001) (“[G]overnment speech
should be limited to purposeful action by government, expressing its own distinct message,
which is understood by those who receive it to be the government’s message.”); Gia B. Lee,
Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1005 (2005)
(arguing for a transparency requirement as a prerequisite for government speech).
190. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009) (noting but rejecting
respondent’s argument that government must “go through a formal process of adopting a
resolution publicly embracing ‘the message’ that the monument conveys”).
191. In this sense, constitutional rights would be protected not just by “property
rules”—which prohibit loss except with consent—but also by “inalienability rules,” which prohibit transfer altogether. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093, 1105-06
(1972).
192. Post, supra note 120, at 152 (noting that the Court has “chosen to address cases of
subsidized speech primarily by relying upon two doctrines, which respectively prohibit
unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint discrimination,” rather than by engaging in
“complex and contextual normative judgments about the boundaries of distinct constitutional
domains in social space”).
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thorough study of the normative visions of the First Amendment
that are threatened when the government subsidizes private speech.
Interest in, and the content of, the law surrounding conditional
offers has always ebbed and flowed with background developments
in the relationship between the government and the recipients of
government funds. It appears that the doctrine and the concerns
animating it are back at the center of the Court’s agenda. This is
understandable enough: never before has the federal government
been so involved in subsidizing constitutionally protected activity,
whether by individuals or by states.193 AOSI is exemplary of both
the need to establish the constitutional boundaries of that activity,
and also the difficulties the Court will continue to face in doing so.194

193. Hamburger, supra note 6, at 567 (“Ultimately, conditions are part of an ongoing shift
in the organization of society—in particular, a shift in modes of dependence.”).
194. See Heyman, supra note 1, at 1198 (“[T]he problem [of denials of support] is best
understood as one of distributive justice in the modern liberal state.”); Schauer, supra note
10, at 990 (examining the problem of unconstitutional conditions among those constitutional
problems that “are irredeemably intractable, and are so precisely because they replicate the
deepest, hardest, and therefore least solvable problems of constitutional government”).

